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Lucid dreaming is a state of awareness that one is dreaming, without leaving the sleep state. Dream reports show that self-reflection and
volitional control are more pronounced in lucid compared with nonlucid dreams. Mostly on these grounds, lucid dreaming has been
associated withmetacognition. However, the link to lucid dreaming at the neural level has not yet been explored.We sought for relation-
ships between the neural correlates of lucid dreaming and thought monitoring.
Human participants completed a questionnaire assessing lucid dreaming ability, and underwent structural and functional MRI. We
split participants based on their reported dream lucidity. Participants in the high-lucidity group showed greater gray matter volume in
the frontopolar cortex (BA9/10) compared with those in the low-lucidity group. Further, differences in brain structure weremirrored by
differences in brain function. The BA9/10 regions identified through structural analyses showed increases in blood oxygen level-
dependent signal during thought monitoring in both groups, and more strongly in the high-lucidity group.
Our results reveal shared neural systems between lucid dreaming andmetacognitive function, in particular in the domain of thought
monitoring. This finding contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms enabling higher-order consciousness in dreams.
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Introduction
Metacognition is the ability to reflect on and report one’s own
mental states (Schooler, 2002).Unlike diverse cognitive processes
during wakefulness, dreaming is not generally accessible tometa-
cognitive monitoring (Windt and Metzinger, 2007). Rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep is the sleep stage most strongly associ-
ated with dream mentation. During REM sleep, deactivations of
the dorsolateral prefrontal and frontopolar cortices have been
suggested to underlie decreases in metacognitive monitoring,
such as restricted volitional capabilities, impaired critical think-
ing, and a complete lack of insight into the true state of mind
(Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002). In contrast to REM sleep, the
rare condition called lucid dreaming allows some dreamers to
regain their reflective capabilities and become metacognitively
aware of their current state of consciousness.
Although standard polysomnographic criteria of REM sleep
are maintained and REM sleepmuscle atonia prevents overt mo-
tor behavior, lucid dreamers are able to communicate their state
by predefined volitional eye movements, clearly discernable in
the electrooculogram (Hearne, 1978; La Berge et al., 1981). Two
studies characterized brain activity during lucid dreaming epi-
sodes, using this approach to identify their onset. Voss et al.
(2009) found that the frequency spectrum of electroencephalo-
graphic activity in the frontal areas during lucid dreaming pres-
ents “hybrid” features of both REM sleep and wakefulness. Also,
Dresler et al. (2012) showed greater blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, and bilateral frontopolar areas, in lucid dreams as compared
with REM sleep. Hence, metacognitive insight into the dreaming
state was consistently characterized by increased activation in
prefrontal cortical regions, which show activation decreases dur-
ing normal REM sleep (Maquet et al., 1996).
During wakefulness, prefrontal areas have been linked to
metacognitive evaluation. For example, visual metacognitive
ability has been associated with gray matter (GM) measures in
Brodman Area (BA) 10 of the frontopolar cortex (Fleming et al.,
2010;McCurdy et al., 2013). Importantly, as Noreika et al. (2010)
have noted, a direct relationship between the neural bases of lucid
dreaming and metacognition is often assumed, but has never
been explicitly tested. In particular, it is currently unknown
whether interindividual variability in frontopolar cortex neuro-
anatomy,which underliesmetacognitive variability duringwake-
fulness, is also connected to metacognitive processes during
sleep, namely lucid dreaming.
Frequent lucid dreamers are rare (Schredl and Erlacher,
2011), which makes it difficult to find participants that will be
able to gain and signal lucidity in the laboratory. However, lucid
dreaming can be studied even during wakefulness, if some of its
enabling mechanisms are stable and trait-like. In fact, associa-
tions between dream lucidity and personality traits (Blagrove and
Hartnell, 2000; Patrick andDurndell, 2004; Schredl and Erlacher,
2004) or behavioral performance (Blagrove et al., 2010) have
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been reported. Here we characterized interindividual differences
across groups of study participants with different levels of lucid
dreaming ability. We hypothesized that prefrontal GM volume is
positively associated with experienced dream lucidity, and that
brain areas associated with high lucidity show increased BOLD
activity during metacognitive monitoring.
Materials andMethods
Participants
We recruited participants from a participant database by telephone con-
tact. The experiment was framed as “The neural bases ofmetacognition,”
and we did not mention our interest in lucid dreaming at the time of
recruitment. Sixty-nine healthy participants took part in the experiment
(18–37 years of age, 34 female) after giving informed consent. Five par-
ticipants did not complete the lucid dreaming questionnaire and one
further participant did not respond to any of the trials in the thought-
monitoring task, resulting in 63 participants included in the final analy-
ses. All participants were right handed and had no history of psychiatric
disease in the past year. The ethics committee of the German Society
of Psychology (Ethikkommission der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu¨r Psy-
chologie) approved all procedures.
Procedure
MRI scanning: thought-monitoring task
Following acquisition of T1-weighted structural images, participants
completed two 11min runs of a thought-monitoring task (adapted from
Smallwood et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009). Each of the runs was
divided into two conditions: “nonmonitor” and “monitor.” The non-
monitor condition appeared first and acted as a control for visual and
motor components of the monitor condition. Because we were only
interested in investigating interindividual differences, the order of the
conditions was the same for all participants. There were in total 20 trials
per condition.
A sign at the start of the block indicated the onset of each condition. A
white fixation cross then appeared over a black background (Fig. 1). After
an interval of 20–40 s (uniformly distributed), a visual analog scale ap-
peared on the screen. The extremes of the scale were labeled “INT” and
“EXT,” for “internally oriented thoughts” and “externally oriented
thoughts” respectively. To prevent anticipation, the location (right/left)
of the INT and EXT signs varied randomly across trials. As soon as the
scale appeared, subjects pressed either one of the two right-hand buttons
tomove a red cursor rightward or leftward. They then used their left hand
on a button box to submit their response. In the nonmonitor condition,
participants moved the cursor to match a target position marked by a
white circle, ignoring the INT and EXT signs. To prevent anticipation,
the target and starting positions of the cursor
were fully randomized. In the monitor condi-
tion, no circle appeared. Instead, participants
moved the cursor along the scale to indicate
how externally oriented or internally oriented
their thoughts were, immediately before the
appearance of the scale. We defined externally
oriented thoughts as those related to the imme-
diate external environment, such as the scan-
ner noise, the visual aspects of the stimuli, etc.
In contrast, we defined internally oriented
thoughts as those that were not immediately
related to the external environment, such as
planning for the day ahead, or remembering
past events. We encouraged participants to
thoroughly evaluate their own thoughts, to
provide continuous judgments along the inter-
nal–external dimension, as opposed to giving
binary responses. The scale remained on the
screen until participants submitted their re-
sponse, or for amaximum response time of 5 s.
Participants practiced the task outside the
scanner and were given time to ask questions,
until they felt comfortable with it.
Questionnaires
After the scanning session, we briefed participants on lucid dreams. We
explained that lucid dreamingmeans to become aware that one is dream-
ing, within a dream. We informed participants that although not every-
body is able to experience lucid dreams, it is not a rare phenomenon.We
then gave each participant a link to an online survey.
The survey included a question related to the general (nonlucid)
dream recall frequency. Possible answers were “almost every morning,”
“more than once aweek,” “2–3 times permonth,” “about once amonth,”
“less than once a month,” or “never”. The survey also included two
different lucidity scales. First, a single question inquired about the fre-
quency of lucid dreams (Schredl and Erlacher, 2004). Possible answers
were “More than once a week,” “about once a week,” “2–3 times per
month,” “about once amonth,” “about 2–4 times per year,” “about once
a year,” “less than once a year” or “never,” Second, the survey included a
questionnaire on lucid dreaming, the LuCiD scale (Voss et al., 2013),
which addresses dimensions of insight, control, through, memory, dis-
sociation, positive emotion, negative emotion, and realism in dreams.
We asked participants to complete the LuCiD scale, referring to their
“most recent, most lucid dream,” We computed the LuCiD score as the
simple sum of all items. From this score we excluded those items related
to negative emotion and realism, because they are not unique to lucid
dreams, but common to both lucid and nonlucid dreams (Voss et al.,
2013). Although the LuCiD scale measures the key aspects of dream
lucidity in detail, it lacks a measure of how frequent these dreams are. To
measure these two aspects together, we asked participants to complete
the LuCiD scale every morning for 1 week, and to complete it each day
referring exclusively to their dream of the preceding night, if they could
recall it. We aimed at obtaining a measure of lucidity that was specific to
the week immediately after scanning. The actual number of times that
participants completed the survey was very heterogeneous, ranging from
a single completed survey, to a maximum of 18 times. The survey began
with a question asking whether participants recalled their dreams of the
preceding night. Only in case that they did, the LuCiD scale was deliv-
ered. The heterogeneity in the number of response instances suggests that
these data may be confounded with both dream recall frequency and,
more importantly, with attitudes toward dream lucidity. Consequently,
we did not base our analyses on these measures, but on a combination of
the LuCiD score and lucid dreaming frequency scores: we computed a
standardized sum score of the LuCid and frequency scores. As this com-
posite score assesses both quality and quantity of lucid dreaming capa-
bility, we call this measure “trait-lucidity.”
The survey additionally included a rumination and self-reflection
questionnaire (Trapnell and Campbell, 1999), two questionnaires on
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Figure1. fMRI thought-monitoring task. In the nonmonitor condition participants slid a cursor sideways along a scale tomatch
a target circle. In themonitor condition, participants slid the cursor along the scale to indicate how internally oriented or externally
oriented their thoughts were (see Materials and Methods). The two conditions were matched for visual and motor features, but
differed in the thought-monitoring component.
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public and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975; Grant et
al., 2002), and a visual imagery scale (Marks, 1973). Public self-
consciousness included items such as, “I am concerned about what other
people think of me.” Private self-consciousness included items such as “I
reflect about myself a lot,” and the self-reflection questionnaire included
“I love analyzing why I do things.” Participants responded to all items on
a six-point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
MRI data acquisition parameters
We acquired images on a 3 T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner system (Sie-
mensMedical Systems) using a 12-channel radiofrequency head coil and
structural images using a three-dimensional T1-weighted magnetization
prepared gradient-echo sequence based on the ADNI protocol [www.
adni-info.org; repetition time (TR)  2500 ms; echo time (TE)  4.77
ms; TI 1100ms, acquisitionmatrix 256 256 176, flip angle 7°;
1 1 1mmvoxel size].We asked participants to keep their eyes closed
during the structural data collection.
We collected functional images using a T2*-weighted echo planar im-
aging (EPI) sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR 2000 ms, TE
30 ms, image matrix 64 64, FOV 216 mm, flip angle 80°, voxel
size 3  33 mm3, 36 axial slices). We presented visual stimuli in the
scanner through Visuastim digital video goggles (Resonance Technol-
ogy).We collected responses using a four-button bimanual response box
(Current Designs).
MRI data processing and analysis
Voxel based morphometry.We processed anatomical images with VBM8
(http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/vbm), incorporated into the SPM8 tool-
box (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).We respected the default param-
eters for image preprocessing. The VBM8 toolbox involves bias
correction, tissue classification, and affine registration. We used the
affine registered GM and white matter (WM) segments to build a cus-
tomized DARTEL (diffeomorphic anatomical registration through ex-
ponentiated lie algebra) (Ashburner, 2007) template. We then created
warped GM and WM segments. We applied modulation to preserve the
local amount of a particular tissue during geometrical transformation by
dividing voxel values in the segmented images by the Jacobian determi-
nants derived from the spatial normalization step. In effect, the analysis
of modulated data tests for regional differences in the absolute amount
(volume) of GM. Finally, we smoothed images with a kernel of 8 mm
full-width at half-maximum (FWHM). For statistical analysis, we ran
whole brain paired t tests comparing GM volume between lucidity
groups. We thresholded the resulting maps with p  0.001 and the sta-
tistical cluster extent threshold was corrected for multiple comparisons
combined with a nonstationary smoothness correction (Hayasaka et al.,
2004).
fMRI data processing and analyses.We excluded the first four volumes
of all EPI series from the analysis to allow the magnetization to approach
a dynamic equilibrium. We applied slice-time correction and realign-
ment to all EPI sets. A mean image for all EPI volumes was created, to
which we spatially realigned individual volumes by means of rigid body
transformations. We coregistered the structural image with the mean
image of the EPI series. We normalized the structural T1 image to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, applied the normaliza-
tion parameters to the EPI images to ensure an anatomically informed
normalization. Finally, we smoothed images with a kernel of 8 mm
FWHM.
We defined reaction times (RTs) as the earliest movement of the cur-
sor, andmovement times (MTs) as the time of the button press to submit
the response. In trials in which no cursor movement was present (pre-
sumably because the starting position of the cursor was exactly the target
position); the MT was taken as the RT. We ran statistical analyses at the
subject level using a general linear model (GLM). We modeled each
appearance of the visual scale (each trial) as a discrete event, with a
duration given by the total MT. The resulting vectors were convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function and its temporal de-
rivatives to form the regressors in a design matrix. We used a high-pass
filter of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in the time series data. We
also included in theGLMrealignment parameters in all six dimensions to
account for variance associated with head motion. Statistical parameter
estimates were computed separately for each voxel for all columns in the
design matrix, and contrasted to test for main effects, at the within-
participant level. The resulting contrast images were then entered as
input images at the second (between-participant) level, to test for main
effects of condition.
We used the Marsbar toolbox (v0.43, http://marsbar.sourceforge.net) to
build regions-of-interest (ROIs) and extract BOLD signal estimates. We used
MRIcron(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron)toreportand
display fMRI results.
Stimuli and statistical testing
Stimuli and tasks were presented with MATLAB version r2012a (Math-
Works) using the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3.0 (Brainard, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007) and the COGENT 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.
ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). We computed statistical analyses with SPSS 20,
(IBM) and R, version 3.0.3 (R Core Team, 2013).
Results
VBM results: lucid dreaming
To identify the neural bases of lucid dreaming, we median split
participants into two groups according to their trait-lucidity
score (high- and low-lucidity, n  31 in each group). We ex-
cluded one participant from the analyses because their score
matched the median trait-lucidity score. We confirmed that the
results remained largely unchanged when we included this par-
ticipant randomly in either lucidity group. We then compared
the brain structure of the two lucidity groups using voxel-based
morphometry (VBM). Using age, gender, general (nonlucid)
dream recall frequency, and total intracranial volume as covari-
ates of no interest, we found that the high lucidity group pre-
sented greaterGMvolume in two separate clusters within BA9/10
[peak MNI: (4, 57, 31), uncorrected cluster extent (k)  87 and
(30, 51, 6), k 314]. We also found GM volume in hippocam-
pus bilaterally (peak MNI: (21, 31, 3), k  430 and (21,
31, 3), k  280], and two additional clusters, one in right
anterior cingulate cortex [ACC; peak MNI:(10 48 9), k  192]
and in left supplementary motor area [SMA, peakMNI: (15 14
67), k  302]. All clusters were corrected for nonstationary
smoothness (Hayasaka et al., 2004) andminimum expected clus-
ter extent (k 83). Greater GM volume in BA10 has been asso-
ciated with greater metacognitive ability in the visual domain
(Fleming et al., 2010;McCurdy et al., 2013). In addition, this area
has been related to monitoring activity (Fleming et al., 2012; De
Martino et al., 2013). This raises the intriguing possibility that
lucid dreaming might in fact rely on some core metacognitive
mechanisms shared across different metacognitive tasks. To test
this hypothesis, we evaluatedwhether the areas in BA9/10 that we
identified are involved in thought monitoring processes (Fig. 2).
Monitoring task: behavioral results
To rule out any behavioral differences between the two lucidity
groups, we examined the distribution and speed of responses
in the monitor and nonmonitor conditions, for each group. We
first examined the distribution of responses along the internal-
external axis in the monitor condition (Fig. 3A). Aggregated
responses for participants in each group were uniformly distrib-
uted along the internal-external continuum, with a small dip in
themiddle values, suggesting that participants tended to consider
their thoughts as “mostly internal” or “mostly external.” Impor-
tantly, there were no overt differences between the two lucidity
groups.
We then calculated mean RTs (first time of movement) and
MTs (time to click) for each condition, separately for the high
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lucidity and low lucidity group (Fig. 3B). We analyzed RTs and
MTs separately. As expected, a two-waymixed effects ANOVAon
the RTs with the factors of condition (monitor/nonmonitor) and
lucidity (high/low) revealed a significant effect of condition
(F(1,60)  103.043, p  0.001) with longer RTs in the monitor
condition as compared with the nonmonitor condition. This
difference might represent the RT cost of thought monitoring.
Importantly, there was no significant effect of lucidity (F(1,60)
0.021, p  0.884) or condition x lucidity interaction (F(1,60) 
0.038, p 0.846).
The same was true for a two-way mixed ANOVA on theMTs,
where monitor MTs were significantly longer than nonmonitor
MTs (F(1,60) 19.436, p 0.001), but there were no significant
differences between lucidity groups (F(1,60) 0.753, p 0.389) or
a condition x lucidity interaction (F(1,60) 0.001, p 0.976).
Because we found no significant RT or MT differences be-
tween lucidity groups, we sought for differences in the pattern of
BOLD activity between the groups, which cannot simply be ex-
plained by behavioral differences.
Monitoring-related BOLD activity
We conducted a ROI-based analysis to test whether the areas
within BA9/10 identified in the VBM analysis are involved in
thought monitoring processes. As a control region, we in-
cluded the ACC cluster identified in the VBM analysis, as it lies
within an anatomically distinct region on the frontal cortex for
which no prominent role in metacognition has been reported.
We first built three spherical, 5 mm ROIs, centered on the
peak voxel of each of the three prefrontal clusters identified by
VBM. We then extracted percentage signal change in BOLD
activity (relative to the implicit baseline) for each condition
separately, and for each ROI (Fig. 4). To identify which of
these areas show a significant effect of condition in BOLD
activity, we three independent mixed effects 2  2 ANOVAs,
one in each of the individual ROIs, with the factors of condi-
tion and lucidity. As expected, we found significant effects of
condition in the two ROIs located within BA9/10 [peak MNI:
(30 51 6): F(1,60)  9.490, p  0.003 and peak MNI: (4, 57,
31), F(1,60) 5.995, p 0.017]; but not in the ROI included in
right ACC [peak MNI: (10 48 9), F(1,60)  4.442, p  0.235].
Together, these results show that the BA9/10 ROIs that
showed greater GM volume for the high-lucidity group as
compared with the low-lucidity group are also differentially
involved in thought monitoring activity. Importantly, this is
not a general effect, but is specific to BA9/10.
z = -6 z = -3 z = 0 z = 3 z = 6
z = 12 z = 15 z = 27 z = 30
6420
t-value
z = 9
z = 33
Figure 2. VBMdifferences between the two lucidity groups. The high-lucidity group showed greater GM volume in two separate clusters within BA9/10, in right ACC, left SMA and hippocampus
bilaterally. Results are corrected for minimum cluster extent and nonstationary smoothness (Hayasaka et al., 2004).
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Figure3. Behavioral results in the thought-monitoring taskA, Distributionof responses for the thought-monitoring task on the continuous internal– external scale for eachof the lucidity groups.
B, Mean RTs (solid lines) and MTs (dashed lines) for the monitor and nonmonitor conditions. Error bars represent SEM, and asterisks indicate significant differences ( p 0.05).
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Discussion
Lucid dreaming has often been related to metacognition (Kaiian,
1994; Kahan, 2001; Hobson and Voss, 2011). To our best
knowledge, however, no previous study has tested a link be-
tween lucidity and metacognitive ability at the neural level.
Here, we compared two groups of participants, split according to
their score in a validated lucid dreaming questionnaire (Voss et
al., 2013). First, we found that participants in the high-lucidity
group had greater GMvolume in BA9/10 comparedwith those in
the low-lucidity group. Moreover, a ROI defined a priori around
the peak GM difference voxel showed greater BOLD signal dur-
ing a thought-content monitoring condition as compared with a
control condition that required no thoughtmonitoring, but con-
trolled for low-level visual input andmotor output. This suggests
that the areas in BA9/10 identified by structural analyses play a
role in second order monitoring activity. In addition, the high
lucidity group showed a trend toward stronger difference be-
tween the monitor and nonmonitor conditions compared with
the low-lucidity group. This suggests that the corresponding pat-
terns of brain activity might be more distinct between conditions
for participants in the high-lucidity group than in those partici-
pants in the low-lucidity group. Together, these results support
our main hypothesis and show, for the first time, a neural link
between dream lucidity and metacognitive function.
Role of BA9/10 in metacognition
Ample evidence supports a metacognitive role for the frontal
pole. First, it has been associated with multiple, abstract high-
order functions, ranging for example from organization of work-
ing memory contents (Bor et al., 2003) to multitasking and
theory of mind (Roca et al., 2011). In one influential view, BA10
is at the highest point of a gradient, and processes information
that is both more abstract (Badre and D’Esposito, 2009) and
higher in an action-planning hierarchy (Koechlin et al., 2003).
BA9/10 have been shown to subserve self-reflection (Johnson et
al., 2002) and BA10 has been proposed to allow for the conscious
switching between internally and externally directed cognition
(Burgess et al., 2007). Two studies (Fleming et al., 2012;McCurdy
et al., 2013) linked GM volume in BA10 with performance in
visual metacognition tasks. In line with the suggestion that meta-
cognitive ability is a uniquely human trait (Frith, 2012), the fron-
topolar cortex is significantly larger in humans than in other
primate species (Semendeferi et al., 2001) and has even been
suggested to be a distinctively human brain structure. Of note,
striking similarities between brain areas activated during lucid
dreaming and those anatomically most pronounced in humans
have been highlighted before (Dresler et al., 2014a). In particular,
electrical brain stimulation data demonstrated that the induction
of frontal activity facilitates lucid dreaming using 40 Hz tACS
(Voss et al., 2014; see also Stumbrys et al., 2013); and fMRI data
demonstrated increased BA9/10 activity to be related to dream
lucidity (Dresler et al., 2012). Clinically, metacognitive insight
during dreaming and during pathological conditions, such as
psychosis shows remarkable anatomical overlap (Dresler et al.,
2014b). In sum, our results are consistent with the literature, and
suggest BA10 as a candidate mediator of metacognition, opera-
tionalized here as thought monitoring in general, and lucid
dreaming ability in particular.
Because of the specific nature of the thought-monitoring task,
it is important to be cautious in interpreting the generality of the
metacognitive process. Specific task demands might have been
particularly similar to the process of gaining dream lucidity, and
might mislead us to suggest a broad metacognitive mechanism.
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Role of hippocampus in metacognition
In addition to the BA9/10 area, we found that high lucidity was
associated with greater GM volume in left hippocampus. Al-
though interesting, our result is preliminary, and only allows us
to speculate on the possible involvement of hippocampus in lucid
dreaming. In contrast to the diversity of metacognitive domains
that have been associated with structure or function in frontal
pole areas, hippocampal involvement in metacognitive monitor-
ing is typically restricted to metamemory tasks. Greater BOLD
signal levels in hippocampus have been found in comparisons of
feeling-of-knowing versus confidence and familiarity judgments
(Chua et al., 2009) and high confidence compared with low-
confidence judgments (Yonelinas et al., 2005; Chua et al., 2006;
Kuchinke et al., 2013). In addition, volume in both left hip-
pocampus and amygdala has been found to correlate with total
word count of dream reports, and dream bizarreness and vivid-
ness (De Gennaro et al., 2011). Thus, the joint involvement of
hippocampus in both high confidence situations and dream re-
call makes it a plausible player in dream lucidity. We speculate
that greater hippocampal GM allows for a better discrimination
between high and low-confidence states and helps to provide
certainty about the fact that one is dreaming. This certainty al-
lows the dreamer to both sustain the reflective state, and gain
volitional control.
Importantly, this interesting finding also highlights the notion
that metacognitive monitoring does not depend exclusively on a
single prefrontal-dependent mechanism but likely relies on a
combination of factors.
Trait stability of dream lucidity
Here we based our analyses on the unbiased combination of two
different measures of dream lucidity. On the one hand, the Lu-
CiD questionnaire measured detailed qualitative aspects of the
“most recent, most lucid” dream, with higher scores correspond-
ing to dreams that more strongly incorporated characteristic as-
pects of dream lucidity, such as for example memory of waking
life, insight into the dream state and control of dream events. On
the other hand, lucid dream frequencymeasured exclusively how
frequently dreamers gained “some” degree of lucidity, indepen-
dently of the specific dream contents. We assumed that these
measures represented stable characteristics of each individual. In
what follows, we ask whether it is valid to assume that lucidity is
a stable trait, and if this assumption might have led to an overes-
timation of the effects.
Research on personality and individual differences has de-
scribed associations between frequency of lucid dreams and per-
sonality traits. Schredl and Erlacher (2004) have shown that
although lucid dreaming frequency does not appear to correlate
with any of the “big five” personality dimensions, it is associated
with subdimensions of the openness to experience personality
factor, namely absorption and imagination. Also interestingly,
associations between lucid dream frequency and internality in
locus of control scales have been reliably found (Blagrove and
Tucker, 1994; Blagrove andHartnell, 2000; Patrick andDurndell,
2004). Additionally, the comparison between participants with
high and low dream recall frequency (not necessarily lucid) has
revealed differences in brain function. Eichenlaub et al., (2014a)
have shown larger brain reactivity to one’s own name in fronto-
central areas, (Ruby et al., 2013) and stronger resting state activity
in temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, areas
thought to be involved in dream encoding and retrieval (Eichen-
laub et al., 2014b).
Together, these results suggest that dream characteristics such
as general recall frequency and lucidity can be studied as stable
personality traits. At the same time, they raise a voice of caution:
although in our analyses we controlled for dream recall fre-
quency, some aspects of the results presented here might have to
do with individual differences in dreaming “styles” that correlate
with dream lucidity or personality traits. Structural analyses
alone cannot disentangle these effects. To the extent that the
pattern of BOLD activity provides meaningful information on
the function of each area, our results point to the fact that the
clusters we identified within BA9/10 are in fact related to moni-
toring and lucid dreaming. Other clusters, such as the one we
found in ACC, do not show this pattern of activity, and therefore
might be related to other personality traits that covary with
lucidity.
Finally, if lucidity as measured by the LuCiD questionnaire is
not stable, then the different periods of time elapsed between the
reported dream and the time of scanning should have introduced
more measurement noise. In consequence, we should have seen
an underestimation, andnot an overestimation, of the effects.We
therefore argue that measuring trait-lucidity can be considered a
conservative approach.
Conclusion
By definition, lucid dreaming denotes the successful reflection on
the current state of mind, i.e., an act of metacognition. Our data
indicate that lucid dreaming may be a specific form of metacog-
nition, relying on neural mechanisms akin to thought monitor-
ing. Although this result has been previously suggested based on
dream reports and theoretical arguments, these results provide the
first confirmation of this link from a neuroscientific perspective.
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